These posts acknowledge and celebrate what hitherto had been unimaginable advances of the global socio-economy. Given recent evidence that the framework of this success is being dismantled one element at a time by the country that had been its champion, it may be time to acknowledge its impending death.

For much of the twentieth century, America’s unspoken safety net for workers was mobility. When industries declined or local economies faltered, families could often sell their homes and move to regions where jobs were plentiful. This ability to relocate kept the labour market flexible and gave households a measure of resilience, even in the absence of a more comprehensive welfare state. The 2008 financial crisis, however, shattered this system. Housing prices collapsed, leaving millions of Americans unable to sell their homes, while foreclosures stripped many of even the modest security they had built. At the same time, the federal government directed enormous resources toward stabilizing major banks and financial institutions rather than directly assisting ordinary families. The result was a widespread sense that the rules were rigged, and that the economic system no longer rewarded hard work or protected those who played by the rules. Out of this disillusionment emerged the Tea Party movement, which channeled public anger at elites, government bailouts, and perceived corruption into a new populist energy within the Republican Party. Over the next decade, this wave of grassroots frustration transformed the GOP, pulling it away from its traditional pro-business establishment orientation and toward a populist style of politics defined by anti-elite rhetoric, economic nationalism, and skepticism of government institutions.

The Trump administration represented a profound break from the governing assumptions that had underpinned American domestic and foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. For more than seven decades, U.S. leaders of both parties operated within a broad consensus that emphasized the benefits of free international trade, the central role of private markets in allocating resources, and the importance of science and empirical evidence in shaping government policy. This framework was embodied in institutions such as the Bretton Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the WTO), and the establishment of scientific advisory bodies within government agencies. Yet under Donald Trump, these assumptions were systematically challenged. Trade liberalization gave way to tariffs and aggressive protectionism, as seen in the imposition of duties on Canadian steel and aluminum and the sweeping trade war with China. The principle of market primacy was undermined by interventions that rewarded politically connected firms or punished disfavoured industries, such as renewable energy, while boosting coal and oil through regulatory rollbacks. Evidence-based policy making also receded: scientific consensus on climate change was dismissed, leading to withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, while during the COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts were sidelined in favour of messaging that emphasized political loyalty or short-term economic gain.

This is not a news service. It is acknowledged that science-based policies and multilateral programs are dropped almost daily. It is also understood that once dropped it will take years to recover if it can ever recover. It has the air of being the end of a golden age.